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ABSTRACT 
 Studies have shown that there is asymmetry in how sensitive CEO compensation is to 
lucky factors (factors beyond management’s control) depending on if they increase or decrease 
the company’s market capitalization. This study surveys compensation asymmetry within the 
exploration and production industry due to its susceptibility to the lucky factor of commodity 
price. The study finds that compensation asymmetry in the E&P industry is more extreme than 
the broader market. In the broader market, previous studies have found that a CEO’s 
compensation becomes less sensitive to luck in years of bad luck relative to years of good luck. 
The directional relationship remains the same. In the E&P industry, however, the directional 
relationship of this sensitivity reverses in bad luck years, and an E&P CEO’s total compensation 
actually increases when market capitalization decreases due to luck. The driving factor of this 
enhanced asymmetry are likely abundant external job market opportunities.  
Keywords: Compensation, energy, pay for luck, asymmetry, CEO   
Discipline: Business, Finance  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Executive compensation is a frequently covered topic by the media. Stories of CEOs 
taking home millions of dollars, often times when their company is performing poorly, never fail 
to garner attention and create outcry amongst investors and the broader population. In recent 
years, the disproportionate face of many of these stories has been CEOs within the exploration 
and production industry. The driving factor behind this phenomenon is likely the drastic success 
of fracking that led to a domestic boom in oil and gas production.  With this radical success, 
however, came outsized compensation. Naturally, the industry leaders who spearheaded this 
effort should be, and have been compensated well for their success. However, the exorbitance of 
some of these compensation packages has come under criticism by the media as being pointedly 
unjust.  
Perhaps a more interesting point is that there seemed to be a number of notable cases of 
exorbitant compensation even following the natural gas price collapse in 2008 and the oil price 
collapse of 2014, when many E&P companies were performing poorly. In 2008, Aubrey 
McClendon, CEO of natural gas producer Chesapeake Energy, took home a paycheck of over 
$100 million dollars despite extremely poor stock price performance (Healy et al. 2012). This 
was an unprecedented level of compensation regardless of industry, and to make matters worse, 
it was at a time when shareholders were losing money and Chesapeake’s employees were being 
laid off. Similarly, Tom Ward of SandRidge Energy received growing $20m+ paychecks every 
year despite his company’s stock tumbling 80% since its initial public offering (Wilmoth 2017). 
The overwhelming justification for these exorbitant salaries the board gives is that poor stock 
performance is due to volatile commodity prices, which are beyond a managers control. 
However, there seems to be little mention of this factor when commodity prices are booming and 
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the majority of the industry’s executives are reaping the rewards. This seems to suggest the 
phenomenon of asymmetry in how compensation varies with commodity price. It appears as if 
an E&P CEO’s compensation benefits from commodity price increases, but is relatively 
insulated from decreases.  
While the severity of the cases of Aubrey McClendon and Tom Ward’s compensation 
certainly aren’t representative of all E&P companies, a couple of quick calculations seem to 
suggest that the same asymmetry problem may exist throughout the industry. From a period of 
2007-2014 when oil prices were booming, the XOP, an ETF that tracks E&P firms increased 
~90% while median sector CEO compensation increased ~63%. However, after oil prices 
collapsed the XOP fell ~56% from 2014-2016, while median CEO salaries only fell ~12%. This 
is a rough method of illustrating the phenomenon, but it suggests that the same compensation 
dilemma may exist across the entire E&P industry. Because commodity price is such an integral 
part of an E&P company’s value it seems as if it has become an easily manipulatable method of 
asymmetrically compensating CEOs even when the factor is beyond their control. This research 
paper will outline a detailed study of whether this asymmetry phenomenon actually exists within 
the industry and if it does, what factors are driving it.  
2. EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION THEORY 
2.1 The Function of the Compensation Contract  
Before exploring how commodity price may asymmetrically benefit E&P CEOs, it is 
important to cycle back and understand the broader theories of executive compensation design. 
The need for a properly designed executive compensation policy stems from principal-agent 
conflicts. A manager is naturally incentivized to maximize his personal wealth with the lowest 
effort expenditure, while the shareholder’s goal is to maximize the value of the company to 
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generate returns on their equity. Because the manager runs the day to day operations of the firm 
and the shareholder cannot easily observe his or her actions, the best way to ensure the 
shareholder’s goals are met is to align the manager’s decision-making incentives with those of 
shareholders. The compensation contract is the tool that creates the bridge between these 
incentives.  
While this may seem like a simple concept in theory, this goal of perfect incentive 
alignment through contract design is almost impossible to achieve in the real world due to 
significant intervening factors. The two predominant factors are the influence of the talent 
market for executives and poor corporate governance that prevents compensation committees 
from operating at arms-length from managers. In addition, even if an ideal compensation scheme 
has been reached it is not possible to know when or what it is composed of. This is because of 
the endogeneity present in attempting to measure how compensation specifically affects firm 
performance and the opaqueness from the public shareholder’s perspective as to what factors go 
into determining compensation because a large portion is undisclosed or discretionary in nature. 
Two theories have emerged from previous literature that attempt to explain how compensation 
design might function in the real world.  
2.2 Shareholder Value Maximization Theory 
The first and most predominant theory in the literature is “shareholder value 
maximization,” which argues that compensation contracts are simply the outcome of an efficient 
talent market. They are designed to maximize value for shareholders under the constraint that 
firms must compete in the labor market for executives. This talent market competition aspect 
implies that firms must offer executives pay and incentives beyond that which is aligned with 
shareholders (i.e equity or options). This includes a fixed base salary, severance packages, and 
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other personal perks. The theory assumes that the board constructs the CEO’s compensation 
contract to the point at which the CEO has no better external opportunity and the firm cannot 
find a better executive with a greater value proposition for shareholders (Edmans et al. 2017).  
2.3 Rent Extraction Theory  
Shareholder value maximization makes major assumptions that may not be reflective of 
reality, namely that compensation committee members design the policies at “arm’s length,” 
meaning they are not influenced by relationships with managers themselves (Bebchuk et al. 
2005). Common intuition tells us that this is unlikely to be true, which leads us to the second 
major theory, the “rent extraction view.” The rent extraction view argues that managers have 
significant influence over a company’s compensation committee through personal relationships 
and are able to effectively set their compensation contracts themselves. The level of 
compensation is subsequently determined as the maximum amount of pay they can extract 
without drawing intervention from shareholders (Edmans et al. 2017).   
3. PAY FOR LUCK LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.1 Defining Pay for Performance vs Pay For Luck  
According to the value maximization theory, compensation is only optimal if it rewards 
CEOs for making decisions that increase value for shareholders, or if it is necessary to retain the 
services of the CEO and prevent departure to another firm. The first of these two factors can be 
deemed “pay for performance.” The CEO is compensated for exerting effort in making a 
decision or creating a strategy that directly benefits shareholders. Thus, the optimal contract 
should vary compensation on any observable measure that is informative of a CEO’s effort in 
increasing firm value (Holstrom 1979). “Pay for Luck” then is compensation that is the result of 
a change in firm value from factors that are beyond a CEO’s effort. It is important to note that 
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these factors must be readily observable and measurable, such as commodity price or exchange 
rates, not random variation from unknown effects. In optimal contract theory, these observable 
luck measures should be included in a contract for the purpose of obtaining a more accurate 
measure of what portion of firm success is due to a CEO’s effort. Observable measures of luck 
should be essentially used to back out the firm’s success due to a manager’s performance. This 
implies that compensation should not have any correlation with the luck measure. The 
phenomenon of Pay for Luck in the real world, however, is that manager’s compensation does in 
fact significantly vary with observable luck measures.  
3.2 Evidence of Pay for Luck 
The literature has exhibited evidence that Pay for Luck exists in a variety of different 
settings. In a seminal study, Bertrand and Mullainathan found that CEO compensation had a 
significant relationship with observable luck measures in three different contexts, the oil and gas 
industry, the trading goods sector, and through relative performance evaluation. It was found that 
the compensation varies just as much with “the general dollar as the lucky dollar.” This means 
that the authors found little to no evidence of the filtering effect discussed in the preceding 
paragraph that an observable measure of luck would be used for in an optimal contract (Bertrand 
and Mullainathan 2001). In addition, Gopalan, Milbourne, and Song demonstrated that CEO pay 
has a significant relationship with a firm’s sector performance, while according to optimal 
contract theory there should be no correlation (2010). Thus, it is clearly established that 
managers are compensated on luck measures in the real world.  
3.3 Evidence of Asymmetry in Pay for Luck 
Symmetric Pay for Luck does not benefit a risk averse manager. In fact, a risk averse 
manager would prefer to have compensation vary purely on performance, than to have it vary 
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symmetrically with a luck measure. This is because their firm related wealth can vary up or 
down in equal increments based on how the luck measure performs. The concept of risk aversion 
states that a loss in wealth hurts more than an equivalent gain. Because of this, a manager would 
prefer to have no exposure at all than exposure to the risk of luck with an expected net effect on 
wealth of zero (symmetric). Thus, managers only benefit from pay for luck when it is 
asymmetric in nature. This means that their wealth increases with an increase in a luck measure 
more than it decreases with an equivalent decrease in luck.     
Evidence of asymmetry in pay for luck is a more contested issue, however existing 
literature skews in favor of the idea that it exists. The leading work on the subject is from Garvey 
and Milbourn, who found that there is significant asymmetry in the effect of pay for luck on 
annual total compensation. By analyzing how total compensation correlates to market risk in 
various time frames, they found that managers generally lose 25-45% less pay from bad luck, 
than they benefit through good luck (Garvey and Milbourne 2006).  Daniel, Li, and Naveen, 
however, offer two criticisms of this conclusion that they argue diminishes the significance of 
Garvey and Milbourne’s findings. First, they argue that annual compensation is not the right 
dependent variable to properly measure pay for luck as it only encompasses a small portion of an 
executive’s total compensation. Instead, they argue that the change in the executive’s firm 
related wealth should be used to proxy “total effective compensation.” Multiple different 
executive compensation scholars have supported this concept as discussed earlier (Edmans et al. 
2017). In measuring the change in firm specific wealth the authors found no significant 
asymmetry (Daniel et al. 2013). A second study criticized Garvey and Milbourne’s lack of 
control for firm size. They found no significant asymmetry in pay for luck after excluding the top 
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0.4% of firms by market cap (Daniel et al. 2016). Thus, it is not abundantly clear that pay for 
luck asymmetry is a pervasive factor across all firms.   
3.4 Theories of Why Pay for Luck Exists  
Rent Skimming Rationale for Pay for Luck  
Bertrand and Mullainathan justified the existence of pay for luck through the rent 
skimming theory. They argued that managers have control over their board, and as a result can 
influence their contracts to include compensation based on a luck measure. As a result, in times 
of good performance when shareholders are less likely to scrutinize management compensation, 
managers can extract more rents by taking pay for luck compensation that would likely go 
unnoticed. They empirically support this claim by showing that executives of firms with low 
corporate governance had significantly more pay for luck than firms with stringent governance.  
Garvey and Milbourne concur with Bertrand and Mullainathan claiming that the asymmetry in 
pay for luck they exhibited was more prominent in firms with lower corporate governance 
measures.  
Shareholder Value Maximization Rationale 1: CEO Retention 
Another potential explanation utilizing the shareholder value maximization theory, is that 
pay for luck is a necessary factor in determining the efficient compensation level in the CEO 
talent market. Cremers and Grinstein tested how pay for luck varies based on the market for 
talent within different industries. They found that homogenous industries have significantly 
greater pay for luck than heterogeneous industries. Homogenous industries are ones in which 
businesses have little differentiation such as in oil and gas, while heterogeneous are more 
specialized. Their proposed rationale was that executives in homogenous industries have more 
external opportunities because their skillset applies to a greater number of companies. Thus, the 
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optimal compensation level necessary in order to retain an executive increases and decreases 
with market performance because the number of external opportunities an executive can pursue 
varies with market performance as well (Cremers and Grinstein 2013). This implies pay for luck 
is necessary in order to maximize shareholder value as compensation increases when external 
opportunities are high, and decreases when they are scarce. Another study that analyzed how 
peer benchmarking affected executive pay contends that the asymmetry in pay for luck is not 
explained by rent skimming, but rather the effect of benchmarking. The authors found no 
significant asymmetry for firms that paid executives above peers, and attributed all of the 
asymmetry Garvey and Milbourne found to firms in which executives were paid below peers. 
The authors argue that this asymmetry in pay for luck reflects the use of competitive 
benchmarking to proxy the reservation wage of a CEO (Bizjak et al. 2008). Firms that already 
pay their executives below peers cannot afford to pay less in a market downturn due to the 
enhanced risk of the executive leaving for an external opportunity, which creates this asymmetry.  
Shareholder Value Maximization Rationale 2: Strategy Adjustment for Industry Trends 
A second shareholder maximization rationale is that pay for luck is a necessary 
component of compensation as it incentivizes the manager to put effort into anticipating and 
appropriately responding to changes in market conditions. Gopalan, Milbourne, and Song found 
that there was significantly more pay for luck in firms with multiple segments and firms that had 
more flexibility to alter segment exposure. In these firms, pay for luck serves as an incentive for 
the executives to invest in costly industry information and to consequently shift firm exposure to 
sectors with more promising outlooks in order to benefit the firm in the case of industry shocks. 
Thus, in some industries, pay for luck is actually an optimal contract feature in order to 
maximize shareholder value (Gopalan et al. 2010). Bertrand and Mullainathan respond to this 
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rationale with their own criticism. They agree that executives with exceptional industry 
forecasting ability should be rewarded for such foresight, however, they tested pay for luck 
amongst the average firm and still found a significant relationship. Utilizing this rationale would 
imply that executives with just average industry forecasting ability are being compensated, 
which they argue is likely not rational.  
4. E&P INDUSTRY SIGNIFICANCE IN ANALYZING PAY FOR LUCK 
4.1 Enhanced Exposure to Luck 
The exploration and production industry produces almost a pure commodity product with 
very little differentiation between firms. Because of this the value of E&P firms fluctuate 
significantly with oil and gas prices. This provides us with a clearly observable, and extremely 
significant measure of luck relative to other industries. Because of this enhanced industry effect, 
evidence of pay for luck can be more easily distinguished in the E&P industry than in studies 
that cover the entire market, which is what almost the entirety of previous literature entails. 
Given the current debate about whether or not asymmetry in pay for luck actually exists, a 
focused study of an industry in which pay for luck has an extremely significant effect could offer 
some clarity. Additionally, it could be the case that performing these studies on the overall 
market obscures some significance. It seems unlikely that industries respond in the same manner 
to pay for luck, yet this seems to be an overarching assumption of much of the previous 
literature.  
4.2 Lack of Previous Academic Research  
Commodity price is one of the single most important factors in the E&P industry. Yet, 
academic executive compensation research covering this topic is limited to a two-page case 
study within Bertrand and Mullainathan’s paper on pay for luck. The study analyzed the top 50 
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oil and gas firms from 1977-1994, and was quick and dirty in nature. By looking at the 50 largest 
oil and gas companies they are almost certainly looking at diversified oil and gas conglomerates 
in which the relationship to commodity price is far more indirect than E&P firms. Thus, the 
significance of their findings is likely obscured. Finally, the data is significantly outdated and 
more than twenty years old. Since then, there has been significant economic developments in the 
industry that have caused dramatic swings in commodity price as well as developments in the 
structure of compensation policies. This provides an interesting new environment to test pay for 
luck.  
4.3 Major Economic Events in Recent Time Frame  
These economic developments are largely due to the industry revolution of hydraulic 
fracturing. Technological advancement in the process of hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking” led 
to a domestic boom in the production of oil and gas as producers were able to pump from 
previously inaccessible reserves (Zuckerman 2013). This was a major economic change that 
quite literally shifted the United States’ dependence on imports for energy. The onset of fracking 
and the subsequent market effects that followed for both oil and gas caused significant price 
movements. First, for natural gas, oversupply by domestic producers without the proper 
infrastructure to deliver it to high demand locations caused natural gas prices to collapse in 2008. 
Second, for oil, in response to the rapid uptick in supply of oil from the United States, OPEC 
drastically increased their own production, which caused oil prices to plummet. This sent the 
domestic E&P industry into distress as producers struggled to breakeven on production costs. 
These significant fluctuations in price paired with the significant changes in compensation that 
followed makes this recent time period an ideal environment to test pay for luck.  
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4.4 Overview of Current E&P Compensation Trends 
 Alvarez & Marsal conducted a survey of the compensation policies of the top 100 largest 
exploration and production firms for the year ending 2016. The survey provides helpful insight 
into how compensation for E&P firms may differ in structure compared to the broader market. 
Firms were separated into different categories by size. There were a couple notable trends that 
are helpful to identify in the context of pay for luck.  
Roughly 80% of CEO compensation was incentive based pay (bonus + LTIC). This 
suggests high potential exposure to pay for luck as a large portion of salary comes from 
performance factors which can be influenced by observable luck measures (i.e Total Stock 
Return). Additionally, discretion in compensation of annual bonuses was extremely prevalent in 
the smallest half of E&P companies. For the bottom quartile, 68% of companies determined 
annual bonuses through a purely discretionary basis. Discretion in compensation setting seems to 
hint at less stringent corporate governance. Of the larger firms that use formulaic performance 
metrics for annual bonuses, 79% incorporated production growth, 55% incorporated reserve 
growth, and 55% included a measure of safety. Notably, since the 2014 oil price crash the 
proportion of firms using production and reserve growth as a performance metric has shrunk 
nearly 10% and has largely been replaced by the use of cost based metrics (G&A expense, LOE 
expense). This suggests a change in strategy in response to new market conditions; however 
veiled underneath this change could be a decrease in pay for luck during bad market times. 
Long term incentives are structured primarily with a mix of time vesting RSUs and 
performance vesting awards. The primary metric for the performance vesting awards is relative 
total stock return with 92% of firms using it in 2017. Interestingly this is a ~15% increase in the 
number of firms using it since 2014, when oil prices collapsed. This is the most significant 
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evidence that seems to suggest asymmetric pay for luck as firms are shifting towards a relative 
bench mark to cancel out the effects of market exposure when commodity prices have bottomed 
out. The fact that these 15% of firms did not use relative TSR when oil prices were booming may 
suggest that the executives at these firms were able to skim off some benefit from luck under the 
guise of performance during this time period. This factor will certainly be explored more. 
5. RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
This study will quantitatively determine if CEOs in the E&P industry are asymmetrically 
compensated for Luck. If a relationship is found, then further analysis will be undertaken to 
determine the driving factor behind this asymmetry.  
Research Questions:  
• Are exploration and production CEOs asymmetrically compensated based on firm 
performance that is attributable to sector returns?   
• If there is asymmetry in compensation due to Luck, what factors are driving it?  
Hypotheses: 
• Hypothesis 1: Market capitalization changes due to sector returns (referred to as Luck) 
have a significant relationship with E&P CEO’s compensation. 
• Hypothesis 2: E&P CEO’s annual compensation will be found to be asymmetrically more 
sensitive to Luck in years of good luck than bad luck.  
• Hypothesis 3: The asymmetry in compensation due to Luck can be explained by either 
poor corporate governance or the availability of external job opportunities. 
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6. DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Data Overview 
The data for this study will come from two primary sources. ExecuComp and the firm’s 
proxy statements will provide the necessary compensation data. CRSP will provide stock price 
data to calculate total stock return.  
ExecuComp 
ExecuComp is a compensation dataset that collects data from firm’s proxy statements.  
Proxy statements contain overviews of compensation plan structure, performance benchmarks, 
and executive employment contracts. ExecuComp breaks down compensation into multiple 
different factors including salary, bonus, options, stock awards, and details on performance 
plans. It also provides qualitative information about the executive at hand including age, tenure, 
position, and the company they work for.  
The data collected is from companies in the S&P 1500 and spans back to 1992. The date 
range provides a long enough timeline to examine how compensation varies in multiple cyclical 
troughs and upturns in both natural gas and oil price. ExecuComp, however, only covers 
companies in the S&P 1500. Because of this it only provides data for 82 of the largest E&P 
companies.  
CRSP 
CRSP is the most accurate source of stock return information. It will be used to calculate 
total stock return for each firm. The data is thoroughly vetted and should be available for any 
E&P company necessary to analyze.  
 
 
17 
 
6.2 Regression Model Framework 
The statistical methodology that will be employed to test pay for luck’s effect on 
compensation will follow that introduced by Bertrand and Mullainathan and consequently 
followed by much of the subsequent literature. This methodology will be catered specifically to 
the E&P industry. The model follows a two-stage procedure.  
First Stage: Predicting Firm Performance with Luck 
Independent Variables: Measure of observable luck – SIC 1311 sector returns  
Dependent Variables: Measure of performance – Total Stock Return 
This stage of the model attempts to measure the sensitivity of firm performance with an 
observable measure of luck. In this case, the performance measure chosen is total stock return as 
it is commonly used in the industry for long term incentive plans. The independent variable is  
industry returns according to the E&P SIC code 1311. While commodity price may have been a 
more ideal measure of luck, the preceding literature uses industry returns as their observable luck 
measure. A necessary step in this analysis will be to benchmark the results to previous papers to 
compare how the E&P industry is different than the broader market, so it is necessary to use 
sector returns. Additionally, sector returns incorporate most of the changes in commodity prices. 
The output of this stage of the model is the predicted amount of firm performance that is created 
by sector returns. The residual amount of stock return is the predicted amount of firm 
performance that is created by manager skill.  
Transformation before Second Stage:  
 The predicted amount of annual return that can be attributable to sector returns is 
multiplied by market capitalization to get the change in market capitalization due to sector 
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returns. Note that this term is simply called Luck from this point forth. This will be inputted into 
the next stage of the regression as one of the independent variables.  
Second Stage: Predicting Compensation with Performance created by Luck  
Independent Variables: Luck 
Dependent Variables: Measure of CEO compensation 
This stage of the model predicts how executive compensation varies with Luck. The 
primary independent variable is Luck as discussed earlier. The dependent variable is CEO 
compensation. Total compensation, salary, annual cash bonus, stock awards, and option awards 
will all be tested separately to see if the effect of pay for luck is stronger in any one category.  
Overview of Controls 
No controls are necessary in the first stage of the regression as sector returns (the 
measure of luck) is all the study is concerned with. Additional controls would give a more 
accurate measure of the amount of return attributable to skill (measured by the residual of the 
model / everything that can’t be explained by the observable luck measure), which will not be 
addressed in this study. The two primary controls in the second stage of the regression are CEO 
tenure and market capitalization. These have been demonstrated to be the most predictive 
variables of compensation. CEO tenure is in the second stage of the model explicitly as 
compensation tends to increase the longer a CEO is at a company. Market capitalization is 
controlled in the model implicitly. The predicted amount of annual return attributable to sector 
returns is multiplied by the market capitalization of the respective company to find the change in 
market capitalization attributable to general sector returns. This measure is defined as Luck. This 
Luck variable is then inputted into the second stage of the regression, and does not explicitly 
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need to be controlled for again. Market capitalization has been shown in multiple studies to be a 
very significant predictor of compensation as CEOs of larger companies tend to be paid more. 
Testing Asymmetry in Pay for Luck 
In order to test if there is asymmetry in pay for luck three methodologies will be used: 
Naveen et al’s relative industry performance regression, an adjusted version of this regression 
using an additional “no luck” categorization, and another adjusted version using categorization 
based on an absolute price distribution rather than returns.  
Two Level Categorization of Bad and Good Luck  
 The majority of the preceding literature use SIC code industry returns as the proxy for 
luck. The first regression methodology used in this paper will follow the process outlined in 
Naveen et al. (Naveen et al. 2013). The following process is described in the context of the 
second stage of the model, predicting change in compensation from Luck. To measure 
asymmetry, a dummy variable for years of bad luck will be used. The dummy variable equals 1 
for years in which industry returns are negative, and 0 when industry returns are positive. An 
interaction variable between performance attributable to Luck and bad luck is used to measure 
the partial effect on the sensitivity of compensation that a negative industry return year has 
relative to a positive industry return year. There is significant asymmetry in pay for luck 
compensation when the coefficient of this indicator variable is significantly negative. Two issues 
with the categorization employed in this methodology will be potentially resolved with alternate 
designs in the following sections. 
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7. SUMMARY STATISTICS 
7.1 Full Sample Summary Statistics 
Table A depicts the summary statistics for all the independent and dependent variables. 
 
The top and bottom 2.5% of observations for annual returns, total compensation, and Luck have 
been winsorized due to significant outliers. As a result, the data started with 659 observations 
and was cleaned down to 533.  
 
 
Table A: Full Sample Summary Statistics
Obs Min 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max Mean SD
Panel A: Original Sample
Total Compensation ($000) 659 $0 $1,938 $4,215 $9,003 $112,464 $7,066 $9,376
Base Salary ($000) 659 0 432 649 971 1,750 724 388
Cash Bonus ($000) 659 0 0 161 848 76,951 876 3,836
Stock Awards ($000) 659 0 6 1,642 3,875 61,078 3,189 5,256
Option Grants ($000) 659 0 0 393 1,665 62,681 1,584 3,967
Annual Return 659 -95% -21% 11% 42% 516% 18% 63%
Sector Return 659 -33% -10% 19% 26% 33% 10% 20%
Luck ($000) 659 -$77,991 -$138 $290 $1,827 $63,028 $1,156 $6,990
Market Capitalization ($000) 659 12,080 878,967 2,538,686 10,631,645 141,240,883 9,382,883 16,532,187
CEO Tenure (Years) 659 0 2 6 11 38 8 7
Panel B: Winsorized Subsample
Total Compensation ($000) 533 $273 $1,968 $3,917 $7,139 $24,263 $5,266 $4,270
Base Salary ($000) 533 0 432 625 912 1,750 691 362
Cash Bonus ($000) 533 0 0 159 725 2,900 466 667
Stock Awards ($000) 533 0 76 1,602 3,459 12,075 2,363 2,726
Option Grants ($000) 533 0 0 393 1,367 7,642 929 1,350
Annual Return 533 -74% -20% 9% 40% 171% 13% 45%
Sector Return 533 -33% -10% 19% 26% 33% 10% 19%
Luck ($000) 533 -$9,403 -$114 $318 $1,452 $16,256 $954 $3,147
Market Capitalization ($000) 533 38,938 921,453 2,382,200 8,436,971 96,752,340 6,646,700 10,335,553
CEO Tenure (Years) 533 0 2 6 11 38 8 7
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7.2 Good and Bad Luck Subsamples  
  
 Table B provides the summary statistics for the two level categorization bad luck (when 
sector returns are negative) and good luck (sector returns are positive) subsamples. Notably, the 
means of each compensation variable are not significantly different between the two subsamples.   
8. RESULTS 
8.1 Using Previous Studies’ Categorization Methodologies (Two-Level)  
 As discussed earlier, the key issue with detecting asymmetry in compensation due to 
luck, is how bad or good luck is defined. The primary regression in this study is run defining 
Table B: Bad vs Good Luck Subsample Summary Statistics
Obs Min 1st Quartile Median 3rd Quartile Max Mean SD
Panel A: Good Luck
Total Compensation ($000) 379 $308 $1,966 $4,039 $7,127 $24,263 $5,346 $4,391
Base Salary ($000) 379 0 440 615 940 1,750 697 362
Cash Bonus ($000) 379 0 0 187 825 2,900 522 718
Stock Awards ($000) 379 0 265 1,641 3,286 12,075 2,332 2,641
Option Grants ($000) 379 0 0 410 1,345 7,641 954 1,407
Annual Return 379 -68% 2% 23% 51% 171% 28% 41%
Sector Return 379 2% 13% 25% 27% 33% 21% 10%
Luck ($000) 379 $1 $265 $782 $2,429 $16,256 $2,001 $2,857
Market Capitalization ($000) 379 38,398 100,086 2,722,890 9,395,723 96,752,340 7,376,757 11,186,796
CEO Tenure (Years) 379 0 3 6 11 37 8 7
Panel B: Bad Luck
Total Compensation ($000) 154 $273 $2,035 $3,670 $7,159 $20,680 $5,065 $3,959
Base Salary ($000) 154 21 409 641 875 1,750 674 327
Cash Bonus ($000) 154 0 0 54 456 2,500 326 493
Stock Awards ($000) 154 0 0 1,461 3,698 12,059 2,439 2,931
Option Grants ($000) 154 0 0 261 1,434 6,306 866 1,200
Annual Return 154 -74% -47% -28% -7% 53% -25% 28%
Sector Return 154 -33% -19% -16% -12% -2% -16% 8%
Luck ($000) 154 -$9,404 -$2,206 -$573 -$182 -$16 -$1,621 $2,210
Market Capitalization ($000) 154 62,410 690,732 1,645,999 5,503,473 50,455,189 4,850,000 7,595,351
CEO Tenure (Years) 154 0 2 5.5 11 38 7.3 7.2
22 
 
good luck as when sector returns are positive, and bad luck as when sector returns are negative. 
This is the methodology predominately used in the previous literature (Garvey & Milbourne and 
Naveen et al.). Utilizing this comparable categorization helps benchmark the results of the 
regression with previous results for sanity checking purposes.  
 
 The first primary result of the regression is that each piece of compensation varies 
significantly with Luck, or market cap sensitivity due to factors beyond an executive’s control. 
This is noted by the significant coefficient on the good luck measure (the baseline category). The 
second primary result is that there is significant asymmetry in compensation’s sensitivity to Luck 
between good and bad luck years for all pieces of compensation. Interpreting the economic 
relationship for total compensation is as follows: in good luck years (years with positive sector 
returns), an E&P CEO’s total compensation increases 89 cents for every $1000 increase in 
market capitalization due to sector returns. Conversely, in bad luck years (years with negative 
sector returns) an E&P CEO’s total compensation actually increases by $1.19 (.89-2.073) for 
every $1000 decrease in market capitalization due to sector returns. Comparing these results to 
what previous papers have found is a useful way to determine how the E&P industry might be 
different from the broader market context. 
 
Table C: Two Level Categorization Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Total Comp. Salary Cash Bonus Stock Awards Option Awards
Good Luck 0.89
***
0.08
***
0.05
***
0.32
***
0.23
***
Good Luck x Bad Luck -2.07
***
-0.16
***
-0.06
**
-1.02
***
-0.34
***
CEO Tenure -7.51 4.71
***
9.22
***
-14.12 7.1
R
2
0.36 0.34 0.07 0.17 0.18
Observations 533 533 533 533 533
Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck category suppressed for convenience
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Figure 1: Previous Paper’s Regression Results (Naveen et al. 2009) 
 
 The first model that was run in this study is similar to the one run by Gopalan, 
Milbourne, and Song (2010) which analyzed asymmetry in the absolute level of total 
compensation. The economic relationship they discovered was that “when Luck is up (increase 
in market cap of $1000), the pay for the CEO of a median-risk firm increases by $1.04 (=2.02–
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0.5×1.96), but when Luck is down (decrease in market cap of $1000), it decreases only by 76 
cents (=1.04 - .28) (Naveen et al. 2009). The Luck coefficient in good luck years for the E&P 
firms is similar to that in GMS (.89 vs 1.04 respectively). The major diversion is how sensitivity 
changes in bad luck years for E&P firms. GMS found that across the market (data including all 
industries), during a bad luck year, sensitivity to Luck decreased relative to good luck years, 
however the directional relationship with Luck was still positive: when Luck decreased, 
compensation decreased (in GMS, the coefficient is still positive in bad luck years). However, in 
this study’s E&P data, total compensation’s sensitivity to Luck completely reverses direction in 
bad luck years (the coefficient becomes negative). Rather than simply becoming less sensitive to 
Luck, compensation actually increases when bad luck lowers market capitalization. Moreover, 
this bad luck coefficient is quite large as well.  An E&P CEO’s compensation actually increases 
more for a $1000 decrease in market cap due to sector returns, than it does for a $1000 increase 
in market cap due to sector returns ($1.19 vs $0.89).  
8.2 Sensitivities based on Type of Compensation 
  It has been shown to this point that there is significant asymmetry in total compensation 
due to the observable measure of luck, sector returns. What this implies is that compensation 
committees are consciously crafting CEO’s compensation contracts to vary based on sector 
returns, or something highly correlated with sector returns. Thus, it is important to determine 
what part of total compensation (salary, cash bonus, stock awards, option awards) is being 
manipulated the most to create this asymmetric relationship. Referencing Table B, the order of 
sensitivity in good luck years for the parts of compensation rank from high to low as follows: 
stock awards (.322), option awards (.227), salary (.071), and cash bonus (.0519). The order of 
sensitivity in bad luck years from high to low is as follows: stock awards (-.70 = .322 – 1.018), 
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option awards (-.11 = .227 - .336), salary (-.08 = .071 - .155), and cash bonus (-.01 = .0519 - 
.0598). The key takeaways from these results is that stock and option awards are the most 
sensitive to Luck in good luck years, while stock awards are by far the most inversely sensitive 
part of compensation in bad luck years (-.70 vs next highest value option awards at -.11). Before 
concluding that stock awards are what is being manipulated to drive inverse sensitivity, it is 
necessary to consider other factors that may be affecting these coefficients. The magnitudes of 
these sensitivity coefficients are affected by two key factors: The portion of total compensation 
they make up, as well as the extent to which they are being manipulated by compensation 
committees depending on whether or not a year is good luck or bad luck, which is the key factor 
of interest for this study. In order to gauge compensation manipulation properly, the portion of 
the total compensation make up must first be taken into account. The structure of total 
compensation has changed significantly between 1992 and 2016. The primary change related to 
this study is the shift from option based compensation to stock based compensation after the 
early 2000s. This structural shift is evident in Figure 1.  
Figure 2: Mean Compensation Structure vs Sector Returns 
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 Because of this structural shift in compensation makeup from options to stock awards, 
determining sensitivity based on the entire range of data from 1992 to 2016 does not paint a clear 
picture when analyzing asymmetry for specific types of compensation (whereas it does for total 
compensation). To take this into account the same regression was run over two subsets of data 
split by time. The first subset is for firm years from 1992 to 2004. The second subset is from 
2005 to 2016. The distinction was made because 2005 was the first year in which stock awards 
became a larger portion of total compensation than option awards.  
 
 The results of these subset regressions reveal that between 1992-2004 options awards 
were the most sensitive part of compensation from Luck in both good and bad luck years. In 
good luck years, both stock awards and option awards had similar sensitivities. In bad luck years, 
option rewards revealed significantly more inverse asymmetry than stock awards, which lost 
significance in the model. The trend reversed in the 2005-2016 regression subset. Stock awards 
became more sensitive in good luck years than option awards (.34 vs .24), and more inversely 
sensitive in bad luck years (-.87 vs -.41). It should be further noted that total compensation was 
significantly inversely asymmetrical in both timeframe subsets. Thus, this concept of inverse 
compensation asymmetry that seems unique to the E&P industry has been present throughout the 
1992-2016 timeframe. It did not start happening at some point within. However, due to secular 
Table D: Fiscal Year Subset Regression Coefficients
1992-2004 2005-2016
Total Comp. Stock Awards Option Awards Total Comp. Stock Awards Option Awards
Good Luck 0.65
***
0.13
*
0.14
**
0.90
***
0.34
***
0.24
***
Good Luck x Bad Luck -2.72
*** -0.32 -0.66
***
-1.91
***
-0.87
***
-0.41
***
CEO Tenure -54.85
**
-23.65
* -11.41 44.09 10.05 17.47
*
R
2 0.27 0.06 0.08 0.38 0.18 0.31
Observations 157 157 157 376 376 376
Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck category suppressed for convenience
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shifts in how compensation is structured, the particular piece of compensation that committees 
manipulate to create this asymmetry did change through time. Between 1992 to somewhere 
between 2004-2006, asymmetry was primarily created through option awards. Beyond 2004-
2006, asymmetry was primarily created through stock awards.  
8.3 Sanity Checking Results  
Visually Analyzing Trends in Compensation  
The results show that within the E&P industry compensation’s sensitivity to Luck 
becomes a significantly inverse relationship in bad luck years. This is a novel finding that has not 
been found in past studies (the relationship was still positive in bad luck years, just less 
sensitive). Because of this, sanity checking through data visualization is helpful. In the following 
graphs, the key aspects to look for are whether the median measure of compensation increases in 
years when returns are negative. The mean observations are skewed by significant outliers.  
Figure 3: Total Compensation vs Sector Returns 
 
 Figure 2 reveals that median total compensation in the E&P industry has been increasing 
over time. In recession years (01-02, 08) total compensation remained stable despite significantly 
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negative sector returns. What is even more notable however, is that after the oil crash of 2014 
which resulted in significantly negative sector returns, median compensation increased between 
2014 and 2015. This seems to support the finding of inverse asymmetry.  
Figure 4: Stock Grants vs Sector Returns 
 
 
 Figure 3 reveals a similar conclusion. The focus for stock grants should be post 2004. In 
2008 the value of median stock grants remained the same despite significantly negative stock 
returns. Similarly, median stock grants increased between 2014 and 2015 despite the sector 
return decrease resulting from the oil price crash.  
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Figure 5: Option Grants vs Sector Returns 
 
 The focus on option grants should be pre-2004. The major negative sector return pre-
2004 happened during the technology bubble in 2001. The median value of option grants spiked 
up between 2000 and 2001 despite the significantly negative corresponding sector return. This 
again supports the conclusion of inverse asymmetry found in the regression.  
Taking out Recession Years from the Regression 
 Of the 24 years in this dataset, only six are considered bad luck years (negative sector 
returns). These years are 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008, 2014, and 2015. Two out of these six years 
were (2001 and 2008) major economic recessions and were not idiosyncratic to the E&P 
industry. During these recession years there could have been unique compensation dynamics at 
play. Thus, it is plausible that these recession years could be driving the inverse asymmetry that 
was discovered. In order to disprove this the regression was run excluding firm years from both 
2001 and 2008. Table E shows the results.   
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 The table shows that the inverse asymmetry is still highly significant, not only in total 
compensation, but almost all other compensation components. The interaction term for cash 
bonus was the only one to lose significance. Thus, the impact of the recession can be ruled out as 
a confounding factor for the inverse asymmetry.  
8.4 Results using Other Luck Categorization Methodologies  
 The luck categorization methodology in the prior section was based on the categorization 
utilized in previous papers for the purposes of benchmarking results. However, this many not be 
the most economically accurate categorization. Thus, the regression was run under two other 
categorization methods to see if the inverse asymmetry result holds.  
Three Level Luck Categorization  
Using a categorization method that uses a breakeven point of 0 sector returns (negative = 
bad luck, positive = good luck) may not be accurate because years that are slightly positive or 
slightly negative likely have similar compensation dynamics. Asymmetry is created when a 
compensation board consciously decides to change the amount of compensation they give to an 
executive based on the market conditions of the specific year. It is hypothesized that boards are 
unlikely to make significant changes, if any changes at all, for years in which the effect of good 
luck and bad luck is insignificant. For example, a year in which industry returns are 1% is likely 
Table E: Excluding Recessions Categorization Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Total Comp. Salary Cash Bonus Stock Awards Option Awards
Good Luck 0.89
***
0.07
***
0.05
***
0.32
***
0.23
***
Good Luck x Bad Luck -2.29
***
-0.16
***
-0.05 -1.23
***
-0.34
***
CEO Tenure -4.23 4.67
**
9.22
**
-7.22 5.55
R
2
0.38 0.34 0.07 0.22 0.19
Observations 484 484 484 484 484
Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck category suppressed for convenience
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pretty much equivalent in the board’s mind as a year in which returns are -1%. The bandwidth of 
this lack of action may extend out a couple percentage in either direction.  
 Adding a third category of “no luck” would be helpful in representing this factor. Years 
within a certain percentage bandwidth from 0% industry returns will be considered “no luck” 
years, while years of extreme change in either direction will be considered bad luck or good luck. 
It is hypothesized that the inclusion of these insignificant industry return years in bad luck and 
good luck done in previous studies may be dampening the significance of the asymmetry that 
may truly be present. Using this categorization will likely isolate the years in which boards 
consciously make pay for luck decisions to the bad and good luck categories, while allocating 
years in which action is likely not taken to the no luck category.  
 For the following three level categorization regression, bad luck was characterized as 
years in which sector returns are below -15%, no luck when sector returns are between -15% and 
15%, and good luck when sector returns are greater than 15%.  
 
 The three level regression output does not necessarily support the hypothesis that a three 
level categorization reveals more asymmetry in compensation due to Luck. For total 
compensation, in good luck years, an E&P CEO’s total compensation increases 85 cents for 
Table F: Three Level Categorization Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Total Comp. Salary Cash Bonus Stock Awards Option Awards
Good Luck 0.85
***
0.07
***
0.05
***
0.33
***
0.20
***
Good Luck x No Luck -0.85
***
-0.08
***
-0.04 -0.42
***
-0.06
Good Luck x Bad Luck -1.76
***
-0.13
***
-0.07
*
-0.82
***
-0.26
***
CEO Tenure -9.18 4.58
**
9.12
**
-14.56 6.71
R
2
0.25 0.25 0.08 0.11 0.14
Observations 533 533 533 533 533
Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck and no luck category suppressed for convenience
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every $1000 increase in Luck. In no luck years an E&P CEO’s total compensation does not 
change (0 = .85-.85) with Luck. In bad luck years, an E&P CEO’s total compensation increases 
91 cents for every $1000 decrease in Luck. This compares to total compensation increasing 89 
cents in good luck years, and increasing $1.19 in bad luck years with the two level categorization 
mentioned earlier. Thus, the sensitivity in both good and bad luck years has actually somewhat 
declined despite using more extreme classifications of both good and bad luck.  
 While this initial hypothesis of enhanced asymmetry was not supported, perhaps a more 
interesting, unexpected conclusion resulted in the no luck category. That is that in no luck years, 
compensation has very little sensitivity to Luck. For total compensation the coefficient is 0 (.85 - 
.85), for salary it is -.01 (.07 - .08), for cash bonus .01 (.05 -. 04), for stock awards  
-.09 (.33 - .42), and for option awards .14 (.20 - .06). This lack of sensitivity seems to imply that 
compensation committees do not sensitize a CEO’s compensation much with sector returns when 
sector returns are not extreme in nature. When they are, it seems these committees employ this 
strategy to greater effect as the inverse asymmetry between good and bad luck years is still 
present.  
Using Absolute Prices instead of Returns to Categorize Luck 
The second issue in previous literature’s methodologies regards using sector returns 
instead of absolute price levels to categorize years of good and bad luck. Doing this does not 
reflect the reality of how compensation boards make decisions about pay for luck. For example, 
consider how this model takes into account commodity price shocks. The year in which a 
negative price shock happens will be considered a year of significant negative industry returns 
and will rightly be allocated into the bad luck subsample. However, the years following, in which 
there might be moderate price recovery after the initial shock would be years of positive industry 
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returns because the returns are calculated off a much lower benchmark. These subsequent years 
will be categorized by the model as years of good luck, simply because the industry returns are 
positive after a significantly negative year. In reality, the compensation committees are likely not 
thinking that these subsequent years are “good luck.” In fact, it is just the opposite. Despite 
positive industry returns in these years they are likely making pay for luck decisions more in 
accordance with bad luck years as they will still be recovering from the price shock. Yet, the 
relative performance model will still consider them good luck years. It is hypothesized that the 
results of previous models in the literature may be inaccurate for cyclical industries because of 
this consideration.  
To alleviate this issue, a new methodology of good and bad luck categorization is 
proposed. Rather than using the return on the SIC 1311 sector, absolute levels of commodity 
prices are used: a mix of oil and natural gas prices. First, a distribution of WTI oil prices and 
Henry Hub natural gas prices over the data set time frame will be created (1992 -2016). These 
are real prices that are adjusted for inflation so earlier years do not have a bias to be lower. The 
real oil and gas prices are standardized into Z scores, so oil which has a higher price does not 
carry arbitrarily more weight in the metric than natural gas. These Z scores are then averaged 
together to get the standardized price metric. Years above the third quartile according to this 
metric will be categorized as good luck years. Years below the first quartile will be categorized 
as bad luck and the middle 50% of the data as no luck. Using this absolute price metric to 
categorize years will presumably cancel out the rebound effect that mistakenly categorizes some 
of the years in the dataset using the returns based system. Using the same commodity price shock 
example again, when the initial shock happens it is correctly categorized as a bad luck year 
because the absolute price drops significantly, likely to below the first quartile in the distribution. 
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The difference from the previous methodology is that in the following years, even though there 
will likely be a price rebound (implying positive sector returns), the years will still be 
categorized as bad luck because despite the positive return from the lower benchmark year, the 
absolute value of the average commodity price is still very low. This will result in the follow-on 
years after the shock being classified as bad luck as well. Thus, this methodology properly 
captures a realistic concept of luck for cyclical industries.  
 
The table above depicts the categorization of each year according to this methodology. It 
should be noted that the entirety of the bad luck years are pre-2000, while all of the good luck 
years are post-2005, even though the prices were adjusted for inflation.  
 
 The primary takeaway from the regression results for the absolute price categorization is 
that the bad luck interaction variable became insignificant. This is likely due to poor economic 
categorization that resulted from this methodology. As mentioned before, all the bad luck years 
Table G: Year Categorization by Absolute Price Methodology
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
2 = Good Luck, 1 = No Luck, 0 = Bad Luck
Table H:  Absolute Price Categorization Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable
Total Comp. Salary Cash Bonus Stock Awards Option Awards
Good Luck 0.65
***
0.05
***
0.06
***
0.20
***
0.19
***
Good Luck x No Luck -0.48
***
-0.04
***
-0.03 -0.21
***
-0.11
***
Good Luck x Bad Luck -0.54 .01 -0.03 -0.20 -0.10
CEO Tenure 21.31 6.30
***
11.75
**
5.611 7.05
R
2
0.13 0.13 0.08 0.05 0.11
Observations 533 533 533 533 533
Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck and no luck category suppressed for convenience
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are clustered in the 1990s. Thus, the external validity of using this metric for bad luck may not be 
quite strong. The no luck interaction variable, however, was significant. It showed a similar lack 
of sensitivity that aligns with what was found in the previous three stage categorization 
regression result. This gives further confidence to the conclusion that in year with little luck 
based market returns, CEO’s compensation benefits very little from luck.  
9. EXPLAINING DISCOVERED ASYMMETRY IN PAY FOR LUCK 
9.1 Corporate Governance Subsamples 
 Now that it has been established that this inverse compensation asymmetry due to luck 
exists in the E&P industry, it is important to understand what is driving it. The two predominant 
explanations in the previous literature were poor corporate governance and the presence of 
external job opportunities for CEOs. In the poor corporate governance scenario, CEOs of firms 
have effective control over their own compensation contracts through strong relationships with 
the board. This allows them to manipulate their compensation in years of bad luck to still benefit. 
To test whether E&P firms with poor corporate governance are driving these results, the 
regression was run on firms that had bad corporate governance as well as firms that had good 
corporate governance. 
 The categorization of bad and good governance was created using the Gompers et al., 
corporate governance score. This governance score counts the number of provisions that restrict 
shareholder rights. It ranges from 1-24 with lower being more favorable for shareholders (good 
governance), and higher being unfavorable (bad governance). The author’s primary finding was 
that a portfolio of firms with extremely good governance (democracy portfolio: governance score 
< 5) had significantly higher stock market returns than firms with very bad governance 
(dictatorship portfolio: governance score > 14) (Gompers et al. 2003). The goal in categorizing 
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these E&P firms was to mimic the democracy and dictatorship portfolio categorization as closely 
as possible. However, an issue arose in the fact that the governance score range in the dataset of 
E&P firms was not as extreme as Gomper et al.’s data as can be seen in Figure 5 below. An 
additional issue was the fact that the governance score data was only available up until 2006. 
Figure 6: Governance Score Distribution 
 
Because of the lack of extremity in the data variation, a more moderate categorization was used. 
Good governance firm years were classified as those with governance scores of less than 8. Bad 
governance firm years were classified as those with governance scores of greater than 10.  
 
Unit of Analysis: Firm Years
Table I: Governance Subsamples Regression Coefficients
Dependent Variable: Total Compensation
Bad Gov Good Gov
Good Luck 0.67
***
0.59
***
Good Luck x No Luck 0.40 0.57
*
Good Luck x Bad Luck -0.91
***
-1.18
***
CEO Tenure -71.67 -42.45
R
2
0.31 0.28
Observations 116 125
Coefficient on intercept and intercept effect of bad luck and no luck category suppressed for convenience
37 
 
 The primary takeaway from this governance subsample regression is that the inverse 
asymmetry relationship we have been noticing in all of these regressions is still present in the 
good governance subsample. If poor corporate governance was really driving this asymmetry, 
the interaction variable of Good Luck x Bad Luck would theoretically lose significance for firms 
with good governance. In fact there is very little difference in the sensitivities of total 
compensation to Luck between the bad governance and good governance subsamples. This 
seems to imply that governance does not play a very significant role in pay for luck for E&P 
firms. There must be some other confounding factor that is driving the asymmetry, the most 
likely of which are the presence of external job market opportunities for E&P CEOs.  
9.2 Potential Job Market Explanation  
 As mentioned in the literature review, the presence of external job market opportunities 
for CEOs is a significant determinant of compensation asymmetry due to luck. Moreover, they 
found that a CEO’s compensation in industries that are internally homogeneous, or have very 
little differentiation from firm to firm, have higher asymmetry in pay for luck. This is because 
the CEO’s skillset is more transferable to other companies, which leads to a greater number of 
external job opportunities, which leads to better compensation dynamics in order to retain them 
at the firm (Cremers and Grinstein 2013). The exploration and production industry is the very 
definition of a homogenous industry. Firms produce commodity products that are the same at 
every company. Consequentially, the process of managing operations at an E&P firm is 
relatively the same from firm to firm. This means that E&P CEOs have plenty of potential jobs if 
they were to seek employment elsewhere.  
Another very significant factor that effects E&P CEO’s external job opportunities is the 
tremendous inflow of private capital into the E&P industry that started after the major 
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technological shock of the fracking revolution. The implementation of fracking mean that vast 
quantities of reserves that were deemed inaccessible before could now potentially be drilled. 
Private investors, particularly private equity funds, realized this and started raising capital to 
deploy into start-up exploration and production companies. The significant inflow of capital can 
be seen in the following figure. 
Figure 7: Capital Raised for Energy Private Equity Funds per Year   
 
 Private equity energy funds were practically non-existent in 2003 with only ~1 
billionraised. After fracking started to be adopted the capital raised increased exponentially. The 
total amount sought for 2015, just 12 years later was ~75 billion. When this capital is deployed 
in new start-up E&P companies, management teams are needed to run operations. Private equity 
funds poach management from other larger E&P firms. The incentive schemes these private 
equity funds offer to CEOs to get them to lead one of these private companies are incredibly 
attractive. If the company is successful, the options and stock grants a CEO will receive make the 
upside exponential, most often far greater than the potential upside they have at an established 
company. 
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In order to keep their management teams from being poached by private equity funds, 
publicly traded, established E&P companies must significantly improve their compensation 
dynamics. One of these dynamics that they implement into the CEO’s contract is likely what we 
are observing through this study: inverse asymmetry. It effectively guarantees that the CEO’s 
compensation will continue to increase no matter if the E&P sector loses money or gains money. 
In a volatile industry, this is a very attractive job characteristic.  
Thus, the fact that an E&P CEO’s skillset is easily transferrable to other companies 
paired with the enormous increase in demand for E&P CEOs from private capital seem to 
contribute to significantly more external job opportunities for E&P CEOs relative to CEOs in 
other industries. This significant number of external job opportunities is the most likely 
explanation for why the asymmetry in compensation due to luck is much more drastic in the 
E&P industry than other industries.     
10. DISCUSSION 
 These findings are significant to both academic researchers focused on compensation as 
well as actual compensation committees in the E&P industry. For academic researchers, the 
study is a focused deep dive into an industry that is affected the most by factors of luck 
(commodity price). All previous studies have focused on the broader market and how 
compensation varies with luck in the aggregate across all industries. Focusing on the E&P 
industry highlights just how significant this asymmetry can become. Because job market 
opportunities are so high for E&P CEOs, the asymmetry relationship is such that their 
compensation actually increases when the market cap of their company decreases from lucky 
factors. This type of inverse relationship in bad luck years has not been observed in previous 
studies. Further avenues of research could dive into the job market explanation for this 
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relationship more fully. Due to a lack of access on CEO job market data, this relationship could 
not be quantitatively supported. A researcher with access to this data could help delineate the 
magnitude of the impact the job market has on compensation asymmetry as well as other 
interesting questions such as how lucrative private equity pay packages are compared to those 
offered by larger, public companies.  
 The findings in this study are also useful for E&P compensation committees as it 
provides an aggregate industry-wide benchmark of how a CEO’s compensation varies with luck. 
When crafting the compensation arrangement for their respective CEO, these committees must 
be cognizant of including this asymmetry compensation dynamic (compensation is always rising 
no matter the market state) as other companies can outcompete for talent by offering it. If they do 
not, the CEO will likely leave for other opportunities. They must balance this, however, with not 
overpaying their CEO at the expense of shareholders. The quantitative finding of how sensitive 
the average E&P CEO’s compensation is to sector returns in good and bad luck years provides a 
very useful benchmark to go off of when designing these contracts.  
11. CONCLUSION 
 The question was posed at the beginning of this paper of whether or not compensation 
sensitivity due to luck was necessary, as these luck factors are out of a CEO’s control. Moreover, 
an even more challenging question was whether asymmetry in compensation due to luck was 
necessary. The findings of this study seem to definitively point out that both sensitivity, and 
asymmetry in sensitivity are both necessary in order to retain CEOs. It is easy to adopt a cynical 
mindset that the asymmetry is simply a result of compensation committees rewarding closely 
tied CEOs at the expense of shareholders. This could very likely be the case if looking at one 
individual poorly governed company. However, this stark asymmetry in compensation due to 
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luck is an aggregate trend across the entire industry. While there may certainly be outlier 
compensation committees that are corrupt in nature, the average committee which this study 
effectively analyzes is presumably made up of rational individuals who are acting in the best 
interest of shareholders. Thus, this trend almost assuredly benefits shareholders in an indirect 
manner.  It allows for retention of key, talented CEOs who are necessary for a company to do 
well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
REFERENCES 
Bebchuk, Lucian A., and Jesse M. Fried. "Pay without performance: Overview of the 
issues." Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 17, no. 4 (2005): 8-23.  
Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan. "Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without 
principals are." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 116, no. 3 (2001): 901-932. 
Bizjak, John M., Michael L. Lemmon, and Lalitha Naveen. "Does the use of peer groups 
contribute to higher pay and less efficient compensation?." Journal of Financial 
Economics 90, no. 2 (2008): 152-168. 
Daniel, Naveen D., Yuanzhi Li, and Lalitha Naveen. "Asymmetry in Pay for Luck: A Size 
Effect?." (2016). 
Daniel, N., Yuanzhi Li, and Lalitha Naveen. No asymmetry in pay for luck. Working paper, 
Drexel University, 2013. 
Edmans, Alex, Xavier Gabaix, and Dirk Jenter. Executive compensation: A survey of theory and 
evidence. No. w23596. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2017. P.29 
Garvey, Gerald T., and Todd T. Milbourn. "Asymmetric benchmarking in compensation: 
Executives are rewarded for good luck but not penalized for bad." Journal of Financial 
Economics 82, no. 1 (2006): 197-225 
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick. "Corporate governance and equity prices." The 
quarterly journal of economics 118, no. 1 (2003): 107-156. 
Gopalan, Radhakrishnan, Todd Milbourn, and Fenghua Song. "Strategic flexibility and the 
optimality of pay for sector performance." The Review of Financial Studies 23, no. 5 
(2010): 2060-2098. 
43 
 
Healy, Paul M., Clayton S. Rose, and Aldo Sesia. "Aubrey McClendon's Special Incentive 
Compensation at Chesapeake Energy (A)." (2012). 
Hölmstrom, Bengt. "Moral hazard and observability." The Bell journal of economics (1979): 74-
91. 
Martijn Cremers, K. J., and Yaniv Grinstein. "Does the market for CEO talent explain 
controversial CEO pay practices?." Review of Finance 18, no. 3 (2013): 921-960. 
"Oil and Gas Exploration & Production (E&P) Incentive Compensation Report." Alvarez & 
Marsal. July 20, 2017. Accessed December 16, 2017. 
https://www.alvarezandmarsal.com/insights/oil-and-gas-exploration-production-ep-
incentive-compensation-report. 
Wilmoth, Adam. "SandRidge CEO's pay is among highest in energy industry." NewsOK.com. 
January 15, 2013. Accessed December 16, 2017. http://newsok.com/article/3746282. 
Zuckerman G. 2013. The Frackers: The Outrageous Inside Story of the New Billionaire 
Wildcatters. New York: Penguin 
 
 
 
 
 
